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 Abstract 
Lie detectors, can be applied in a wide variety of settings. But this advantage comes with a 
considerable cost: False positives. The applicability of the Concealed Information Test (CIT) is 
more limited, yet when it can be applied, the risk of false accusations can be limited to an 
arbitrary low level. The CIT assesses the recognition of critical information that is known only 
by the examiners and the culprit, e.g., the face of an accomplice. Large effects are obtained with 
the CIT, whether combined with peripheral, brain, or motor responses. We see three important 
challenges for the CIT. First, the false negative rate of the CIT can be substantial, particularly 
under realistic circumstances. A possible solution seems to restrict the CIT to highly salient 
details. Second, there exist effective faking strategies. Future research will tell whether faking 
can be detected or even prevented (e.g., using covert measures). Third, recognition of critical 
crime details does not necessarily result from criminal activity. It is therefore important to 
properly embed the CIT in the investigative process, while taking care when drawing 
conclusions from the test outcome (recognition, not guilt).   
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 Lie detection versus memory detection 
´Did you do it?´. Just imagine the sheer possibilities if techniques were available that could 
determine whether a defendant’s answer to that question would be true or false. Several 
companies, researchers, and organizations claim to have developed such techniques, for instance 
using activity of the autonomic nervous system (Control Question polygraph test; e.g., Honts, 
2005), facial temperature (Pavlidis, Eberhardt, & Levine, 2002), non-verbal behavior (Meyer, 
2011) and Voice (Stress) Analysis  (Liberman, 2012). Yet, these lie detection techniques have 
been criticized for several reasons (Vrij, 2008). The greatest concern is probably that these 
techniques rely on the stress approach: liars are expected to show more signs of stress than truth 
tellers. Yet, truth tellers may also display the very signs of stress that are used to infer deception. 
When this occurs, the truth teller is falsely accused of being deceptive, the so called false 
positive or Othello-error (Ekman, 1985).  
Consider for instance the Control Question polygraph Test. This test alternates relevant 
questions regarding the reason of the interrogation (´Did you do it?´-like questions such as ´On 
April, 23, did you shoot Sarah?´) with so called control questions (e.g., ´During the first 25 years 
of your life, did you ever tell an important lie?´) while measuring skin conductance, blood 
pressure, and respiration. As lying is assumed to be characterized by increased stress, stronger 
physiological responding to the relevant questions relative to the control questions causes a 
deceptive test outcome. This reasoning is, however, heavily contested (Ben-Shakhar, 2008; Ben-
Shakhar & Furedy, 1990; Iacono, 2006; Lykken, 1974; Meijer & Verschuere, 2010; National 
Research Council, 2003; Patrick & Iacono, 1991). After all, it is transparent to both the guilty 
and the innocent examinee that the relevant questions are most important. Truth tellers may 
therefore also perceive the relevant questions as more stressful, and consequently show stronger 
physiological reactivity to those than to the control questions, resulting in a false positive test 
result. So even though lie detectors have the advantage of having very broad applicability, they 
also share a substantial risk; namely that of falsely accusing truth tellers.  
In contrast to lie detectors, the Concealed Information Test (CIT; previously referred to 
as the Guilty Knowledge Test see Lykken, 1959) possesses exactly the opposite characteristics;. 
It´s applicability is much more limited, yet the false positive rate can be minimized, and a priori 
set at arbitrary low level. Already in 1908, Münsterberg reasoned that the legal system could 
benefit from a method that could determine "whether a suspected person knows anything about a 
certain place or man or thing" (Münsterberg, 1908; p 132). This is precisely what the CIT aims 
to do. 
The Concealed Information Test 
Imagine the following scenario: There has been a hold-up, and the police has reason to believe 
that one of their usual suspects is involved. The suspect has no verifiable alibi, and is brought to 
the police station for further investigation. The suspect denies involvement in the holdup, or to 
even know anything about it. The police officer therefore proposes to take a CIT to determine 
whether the suspect really has no knowledge regarding the holdup. The suspect is connected to a 
machine, measuring skin conductance, breathing, and heart rate. Then, the question: ´Do you 
know what kind of masks the perpetrators were wearing? Is presented, along with several 
alternatives: ‘Were they wearing masks of ….Soldiers? ....Disney 
figures? ...Clowns? ...Monkeys? ....Politicians? ....Aliens?´. The suspects answer ´no´ to each of 
the alternatives. Then, the next question starts, asking about what the perpetrators shouted to the 
security personnel, again presenting several alternatives. After a few questions, the test is over. 
The suspect is disconnected from the polygraph, and the physiological responses to the different 
alternatives of each question are compared. As all alternatives are equally plausible, a key feature 
of the CIT is that the innocent suspect will show similar physiological responses to all 
alternatives (see Figure I). Systematic stronger physiological responding to the correct 
alternatives reveals that the suspect knows more about the crime than previously admitted. Note 
that the interrogation itself may be stress-inducing, and increase autonomic arousal, but is 
unlikely to explain consistent stronger physiological responding to the correct alternatives.  
INSERT FIGURE I AROUND HERE 
Measures 
Initially, the CIT relied on a single physiological index, namely skin conductance 
response (SCR; Lykken, 1959). While it remains to most sensitive autonomic nervous system 
(ANS) measure to date, other ANS measures are typically co-recorded. These include both 
respiratory (tidal volume and pace of breathing, typically combined in a measure labeled 
´respiratory line length´) as well as cardiovascular measures (heart rate, and normalized pulse 
volume).  
From the 1980ies, researchers also started to explore brain measures (Farwell & Donchin, 
1991; Rosenfeld et al., 1988). Most brain studies recorded an electroencephalogram (EEG), and 
found that recognizing concealed information is accompanied with a positive deflection in the 
EEG that may start as early as 300ms after stimulus onset. The direction and latency of this 
event-related potential (ERP) gave it its name: P300 (P standing for positive). A larger P300 to 
the correct alternatives than to the incorrect alternatives indicates recognition. Compared to skin 
conductance amplitude, ERP waves have a lower signal to noise ratio. This brought about a 
number of changes in administering the ERP-based CIT. Because the ERP-based CIT consists of 
the rapid flashing of hundreds of stimuli, ERP researchers searched for a means to assure that the 
examinee is paying attention to the stimuli. In the ERP-based CIT, the examinee first memorizes 
a set of target items, and has to indicate during the CIT whether or not the stimulus is a target.  
BOX1 ABOUT HERE 
More recently, neuroscientists have used brain-imaging technology such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to map which areas of the brain are most active when the 
examinee tries to conceal certain information. A meta-analysis showed that the (bilateral) 
inferior frontal gyrus, the (right) middle frontal gyrus, and the (right) temporoparietal junction 
were found to be specifically reactive to concealed information (Gamer, 2011). Activity in the 
temporoparietal junction has been associated with the detection of relevant and/or infrequent 
events; activity in the inferior frontal gyrus is often related to active response inhibition.  
While the behavioral task in the ERP- and fMRI-based CIT merely served to assure 
processing of the items, it appeared that the behavioral responding may itself provide an index of 
concealed information. Behavioral responding to the critical items appears more error prone, and 
particularly slower than that to the control items. Subsequently researchers found that reaction 
times (RTs) provides a valid index also without the concurrent recording of ERPs (Seymour, 
Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000; Verschuere, Crombez, Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2009).  
Validity  
Since its introduction at the end of the 1950ies by David Lykken (1959), hundreds of studies on 
the CIT have been conducted. The vast majority of these studies took place in university 
laboratories with undergraduate students, who are instructed to hide certain information. The 
type of information they are instructed to hide varies, but can generally be reduced to 
information about a playing card, about code words, about autobiographical details, or about a 
mock crime, with the latter two being the most popular paradigms. In the card test paradigm, 
participants are asked to select one out of several cards, and are subsequently interrogated on the 
card they chose: ´Did you chose number…4? …8? …6? …3? …2?´. In the code word paradigm, 
participants are instructed to memorize certain information (e.g., ´Operation Black Hawk´), and 
later have to hide which information they memorized: ´What was the name of the operation? 
Was it…Operation Barbarossa? …Operation White Dusk? …Operation Black 
Hawk? …Operation Zen To?...Operation Two Fathers?´. In the autobiographical test, 
participants are asked in tempore non suspecto to provide autobiographical information such as 
their name, birthdate, phone number, and social security number, and asked to hide that 
information during the subsequent CIT (e.g., Is your birthday….August, 15?...April, 2?...July, 
29?...December, 3?...May, 6??´). Finally, in the mock crime paradigm, participants assigned to 
the ´guilty´ condition are instructed to commit a mock crime (e.g., theft of an Ipod), whereas 
those assigned to the ´control´ condition complete an activity unrelated to the crime (e.g., go for 
a walk). During the CIT, participants from both conditions are asked about intimate details of the 
crime, such as ´What was stolen? Was it….a laptop?...an Ipod?...a credit card?....200euro?....a 
smartphone?´. 
One of the advantages of the CIT is that the false positive rate can be set at an arbitrary 
low level. To avoid false positives, the CIT test items should be homogeneous. Importantly, this 
can be checked a priori. After item selection, a paper and pencil forced choice CIT can be 
administered in a number of innocents, in order to assure that the critical items are not select 
above chance (Doob & Kirschenbaum, 1973). Furthermore, it has been recommended to present 
the examinee all questions and alternatives prior to conducting the test to rule out idiosyncratic 
reasons for heterogeneity between the items that could bias the test (Nakayama, 2002). Although 
concern was raised that previewing the CIT items may decrease the validity of the CIT (National 
Research Council, 2003) there is no empirical support for this concern (Verschuere & Crombez, 
2008), and it may be legally required to preview the CIT items with the examinee. 
Reviewing 15 mock crime studies, Elaad (1998) found detection rates of 81% for guilty 
examinees and 96% for the innocent. Similar accuracy rates were reported by Ben-Shakhar and 
Furedy (1990), who reviewed 10 mock crime studies and found detection rates of 84% and 94%, 
respectively. MacLaren (2001) reported successful detection of 76% of participants with 
concealed knowledge and 83% of those without concealed knowledge. In sum, whereas the CIT 
has a substantial false negative rate (16-24%), the false positive rate of the CIT is modest (4-
17%). A meta-analysis on 169 conditions of 80 studies using skin conductance amplitude 
showed that large effects were obtained in all four paradigms. Cohen´s d (see Box 1) for the card, 
code, autobiographical, and mock crime paradigm was 1.35, 1.16, 1.58, and 2.09, respectively. 
Across paradigms, Cohen´s d was 1.55. A more recent meta-analysis (Meijer, klein Selle, Elber, 
& Ben-Shakhar, submitted) investigated the accuracy of not only SCR, but also of P300, 
respiration, and heart rate, only for the autobiographical and mock crime paradigm. P300 showed 
an effect size of 1.56 for the mock crime paradigm and 2.17 for the personal item paradigm. No 
difference between the two paradigms was found for SCR, respiration and heart rate, which 
showed effect sizes of 1.55, 1.11, and 0.89 respectively.  
BOX2 ABOUT HERE 
Laboratory research points to the great potential of the CIT. However the examinees 
(criminal suspects vs. undergraduate students), the examiners (police vs. research assistant), the 
interrogation situation (police interview vs. laboratory experiment), the nature of the questions 
(regarding an actual criminal act vs. card number5), and the stakes (winning a small financial 
incentive vs. prison time) all differ greatly from those in real-life criminal investigations. As a 
result, the extent to which these findings generalize to real world applications remains unknown. 
On the one hand, as laboratory studies entail strict experimental control, these estimates may 
overstate the CIT’s validity. On the other hand, real life circumstances such as the threat of 
prison time may actually increases the signal value of the relevant items, and the results from 
laboratory studies may therefore underestimate the CIT’s validity. There is virtually no research 
that examines how the CIT performs in real life. This is all the more surprising given that, in 
Japan, the CIT is systematically applied with several thousands of tests being conducted per year, 
and the outcome of the test has been accepted as evidence in court (Osugi, 2011). There are only 
two published field studies, in which investigators examined the accuracy of the CIT as applied 
by the Israeli police in real-life criminal investigations. These studies indeed indicate that 
criminals escape detection at a higher rate than what was observed in laboratory settings, but this 
might be contributed to the low number of questions used in the tests. Yet, specificity remained 
very high, with only very few innocents being falsely accused of possessing crime knowledge. 
Further field testing is essential to demonstrate the validity of the CIT in real-life settings. The 
key for such research lies in Japan, where the CIT is applied on a daily basis in real-life criminal 
investigations.  
Theory 
Laboratory research confirmed that guilty examinees show enhanced responses to the 
critical items in the CIT. But why? Is it fear of getting caught? Stress? Guilt? Yet, how likely is it 
that such mechanisms are at play in a laboratory set-up? Take for instance the card test where 
someone choses one of several playing cards and appears to react more strongly to the chosen 
card than to the other cards. Even with such neutral stimuli, and even when there is nothing at 
stake, the CIT still has validity (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). Given that differential responding 
in the CIT is still obtained under minimal conditions, mechanisms such as fear and stress are 
unlikely to drive the CIT. Rather than stressing fear or guilt, Lykken (1974) argued that 
Orienting theory can help to explain the CIT: "... for the guilty subject only, the 'correct' 
alternative will have a special significance…which will tend to produce a stronger orienting 
reflex than that subject will show to other alternatives (p. 728)". 
The orienting reflex (OR) Lykken refers to was first described by Pavlov (1927). It is a 
conglomerate of behavioral and physiological responses to changes in the environment (Sokolov, 
1963). Such changes elicit an investigative reaction, and the OR is therefore also known as the 
´What is it reflex?´. The biologic relevance of the reflex is clear: The (potentially important) 
novel stimulus draws attention, allowing the organism to investigate it and determine how to 
respond to it. Laboratory research has shown that novel stimuli (e.g., a deviant tone among a 
series of standard tones) can indeed elicit an OR (Turpin, 1986). It was also found that the OR is 
more reliably elicited and greater for stimuli that are significant (e.g., task-relevant or 
biologically relevant). Thus, stimuli that are novel and/or significant elicit an orienting reflex. In 
the quote above, Lykken only refers to significance to explain physiological responding in the 
CIT. Novelty is also likely to be at play in the CIT. Note that the critical items are presented less 
often than the control items – typically in a 1 to 4 ratio. So, given item homogeneity, the critical 
stimulus represent a change in the environment only for the guilty examinee. The idea that 
novelty also contributes to the CIT is supported by the observation that the greater the number of 
control stimuli (hence, the greater the change in the environment), the greater the responding to 
the critical items (Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 2003).  
Several testable predictions can be derived from the orienting theory. For instance, the 
physiological responses that accompany the OR are well described: An increase in skin 
conductance, a decline in heart rate, and suppression of respiration (Lynn, 1966). That critical 
stimuli in the CIT closely mimic this pattern (Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 2004; 
Verschuere, Crombez, Smolders, & De Clercq, 2009), supports the Orienting theory of the CIT. 
The ERP and fMRI are findings can also be interpreted within the Orienting theory, P300 and 
OR amplitudes, for example, share several antecedent factors. Just like ORs, P300 amplitude is 
inversely related to the subjective frequency of the eliciting stimulus (Donchin & Coles, 1988), it 
increases with the significance of the eliciting stimulus (Johnston, Miller & Burleson, 1986; 
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004; Castro & Diaz, 2001; Berlad & Pratt, 1995), and with the degree to 
which the critical stimulus deviates from the standard stimuli (Ford, Roth & Kopell, 1976). Both 
the P300 and ANS measures seem to reflect attentional processes related to the mobilization for 
action following motivationally significant stimuli (Nieuwenhuis, de Geus, & Aston-Jones, 
2011). 
Finally, it is important to note that critical stimuli elicit a decrease rather than an increase 
in heart rate, again making an explanation in terms of anxiety or stress less plausible. Although 
Orienting theory cannot explain all research findings (e.g., heart rate deceleration elicited by 
relevant items is more extended than one would expect from OR theory), and other processes 
may also play a role (e.g., response inhibition see Verschuere, Crombez, Koster, Van Bockstaele, 
& De Clercq, 2007), it remains the most comprehensive and parsimonious theory to date to 
explain differential responding in the CIT.  
Existing, renewed, and novel applications 
Despite its sound theoretical underpinning in Orienting theory and its large research base, 
the CIT is hardly applied in real life – with Japan being the notable exception. There are several 
reasons why the CIT is not embraced by practitioners (Krapohl, 2011), but two deserve explicit 
attention. First, practitioners are reluctant to change their current practice. Investigators using the 
Control Question polygraph Test, for instance, often fail to recognize its limitations nor a need 
for another test. Secondly, the applicability of the CIT is more limited than any other lie test. Lie 
detectors have the advantage that they can be applied in nearly every case, since they claim to 
provide answer to the crucial ´Did you do it?´-question. The CIT, on the other hand, can only be 
applied when (1) the investigators can come up with sufficient critical details that are likely to be 
known by the culprit, (2) these details are unknown to and can be kept secret from innocent 
suspects until the examination, and (3) the suspect is willing to cooperate with the examination 
(Krapohl, 2011). These conditions restrict the applicability of the CIT (C. R. Honts, Raskin, & 
Kircher, 2002; Krapohl, McCloughan, & Senter, 2006; Podlesny & Raskin, 1978). 
 Recognizing that the CIT can only be validly applied under limited conditions does not 
negate the fact that when it can be applied, it may provide very convincing evidence. Some have 
compared the CIT to fingerprinting in this respect (Iacono, 2011): Fingerprints cannot be 
obtained from every crime scene, but when they are found, and there is no reasonable alternative 
explanation for their presence, they provide important forensic evidence. One way to think about 
possible applications is to start from the different laboratory paradigms that have been used: Card, 
code, autobiographical, and mock crime. Clearly, the translation from the mock crime paradigm 
to real-life applications is most straightforward. In Japan, the CIT is used to detect recognition of 
crime details, including cases of theft, burglary, injury case, homicide, arson, kidnapping, and 
drug possession (Osugi, 2011). Common questions involve the stolen item and actions against 
the victim in case of a robbery; the location where the fuel was obtained in case of arson; and the 
modus operandi and the location of the crime provide possible questions for a variety of crimes.  
 When translating the code word and card test paradigms to real-life situations, one can 
think of assessing possible security breaches. Do unauthorized persons know the password used 
to hack a computer system? Similarly, membership of a terrorist organization can be determined 
by showing recognition of key details known only by members of the terrorist organization and 
the intelligence agencies. The autobiographical CIT can be applied in cases when there is reason 
to doubt the veracity of claims of amnesia (Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012; Meijer, 
Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007). The suspect could then be questioned on the 
claimed amnestic information. The autobiographical CIT may also be of use when there is reason 
to query one´s identity, as may arise in cases of espionage, but also in criminal cases when 
someone is suspected to be a wanted criminal living under another alias (see for instance the 
John Demjanjuk case; Wagenaar, 1988). In those cases, the suspect can be presented with 
intimate autobiographical information to help determine the identity of the suspect. Similarly, the 
CIT could be applied to immigration cases to verify an asylum seeker’s story. For example, the 
country of origin could be determined by presenting question about details one would only know 
if s/he grew up there.  
In the examples above, the CIT is used to infer knowledge of information known to the 
investigator. However, the CIT can also be employed when the correct option is not known, and 
the purpose of the investigation is to detect which of several options is the correct one. This 
approach is often referred to as the Searching-CIT (S-CIT; Osugi, 2011) and can be used to 
discover, for example, the location of the body of a murder victim when the perpetrator is known 
(Nakayama, 2002), or uncover details related to a terrorism scenario (Meixner & Rosenfeld, 
2011). Meijer, Smulders, and Merckelbach (2010) showed that the S-CIT could also be applied 
to a group of mock terrorism suspects and successfully extracted the target, location and date of 
an upcoming terrorist attack (see also Meijer, Bente, Ben-Shakhar, & Schumacher, 2013). 
Moreover, S-CIT can also be successfully applied in groups of suspects if this group includes 
unknowledgeable participants (Breska, Ben-Shakhar, & Gronau, 2012).  
Key challenge#1. False negatives. 
The false negative rate of the CIT is substantial, particularly in realistic set-ups. Here, we 
propose four possible solutions for the false negative problem: Selection of salient items; 
weighing response measures individually; independently assessing the CIT´s sensitivity; and 
combining measures.   
First, lack of responding in the CIT may be related to poor memory. Basic memory 
research has shown that item saliency adds to memorability. For instance, emotionally arousing 
events (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992) are better remembered than neutral events; 
and unexpected events are better remember than expected events (Donchin, 1981). Jokinen et al 
(2006) indeed found that items that were considered more salient (e.g, the stolen good) led to 
greater responding in the CIT than those that were considered less salient (e.g., decoration of the 
room where the crime happened). Using more salient items may help to reduce the impact of 
testing under realistic conditions, as illustrated by Carmel and colleagues (2003). Participants 
enacted a mock crime either under more laboratory or more realistic conditions, with the latter 
including time pressure to enact the crime and incidental encoding of the crime details rather 
than memorizing them to perfection. The more realistic mock crime resulted in weaker detection 
efficiency than the more laboratory mock crime. The important point, however, was that this 
effect was analysis nullified when restricting the CIT to the salient items. Thus, the use of salient 
items may increase CIT validity and buffer detrimental effects of testing under realistic 
conditions (see also Osugi, 2011).  
 Second, it could be questioned whether the CIT will work in each and every individual. It 
is well known that there exist substantial individual differences in general physiological 
responding, and also in the specific process that is believed to underlie the CIT – the orienting 
reflex (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000; Hamm, Cuthbert, Globisch, & Vaitl, 1997; Hodes, Cook, 
& Lang, 1985; Klorman, Weissberg, & Wiesenfeld, 1977; Ogorman, 1990). To accommodate for 
individual differences, Matsuda et al (2006) proposed to assess in which physiological system 
the individual is most responsive, and to use this information to weigh the physiological signals 
in the scoring of the CIT. Thus, when an individual shows primarily reactivity in the respiratory 
channel, the examiner could rely stronger on that channel and less on the other channels.  
Third, Noordraven and Verschuere (2013) tried to independently assess whether an 
individual responds in a CIT, allowing to predict in whom the CIT is most likely to work. Guilty 
and innocent mock crime participants were administered a RT-based CIT that required speeded 
Yes-response to target items, and No-responses to both critical and control items. Guilty 
individuals showed a marked slowing on the crime items compared to the control items, but this 
was particularly so for individuals who also showed a marked slowing on the target items, 
indicating that target responsivity could index the CIT´s potential. Screening out individuals 
without reliable target slowing indeed increased the CIT´s discriminative ability. 
Fourth, the sensitivity of the CIT may be increased by combining several measures. The 
fact that autonomic, behavioral and central nervous system measures are typically recorded in 
dedicated CIT protocols complicates the combination of measures. For instance, ERPs requires 
averaging across a great number of trials, whereas the number of trials is limited for ANS-based 
tests because of habituation. Rather than forcing measures into other protocols (Gronau et al., 
2005, Kozel et al., 2009; but see e.g. Matsuda, Nittono, & Ogawa, 2011), there may be more 
merit in combining measures that are optimally recorded in the same protocol (e.g., several ANS 
measures; Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 2008), or in combining paradigms. Meijer 
and colleagues (E. H. Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007), for instance, found 
that a forced choice paper and pencil test – the Symptom Validity Test (SVT) – can have 
incremental validity to an ANS-based CIT.  
Key challenge#2. Faking. 
In real-life, a failed CIT (i.e., ´recognition indicated´) can have great consequences. 
Examinees may therefore be motivated to try to alter the test outcome in their best interest. Such 
attempts are known as faking or countermeasure strategies (for a review see Ben-Shakhar, 2011). 
Faking can come in many forms, yet successful faking entails creating a pattern of responding 
that mimics that of the innocent. The examinee can either try to avoid enhanced responding to 
the critical items, or increase responding to the control items. Researchers have explored both 
physical (e.g., biting your tongue) as well as psychological means (e.g., thinking about an 
upsetting event) to evoke a response to the control items. Honts and colleagues (1996) found that 
the sensitivity of the electrodermal measure decreased from 80% in the control condition to only 
10% and 40%, in the physical and psychological faking strategy condition, respectively. Ben-
Shakhar and Dolev (1996) also found that faking significantly reduced the validity of the 
electrodermal measure. Remarkably, both studies found that respiratory measures were not 
affected by faking. The sensitivity of the P300-based CIT was also observed to drop substantially 
through faking (from 82% to 18%; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Most recently, the effects of faking 
on the fMRI-based CIT were investigated, again with clear effects of faking: Sensitivity dropped 
from 100% to only 33% (Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011). The effects of 
faking seem robust. Claims of resistance to faking should therefore be regarded with great 
caution. For instance, it seems hazardous to conclude from the studies above that respiratory 
measures would be resistant to faking. Surely, dedicated strategies (holding breath or paced 
breathing) can affect the respiratory measures to the extent that any difference in respiration 
between the critical and control items is nullified.  
We see two main strategies to cope with faking: Faking prevention and faking detection.  
The use of covert measures was proposed to prevent faking (Elaad, 2011a). The reasoning is 
straightforward: A suspect who is unaware of being assessed, is unlikely to engage in faking 
strategies. Elaad and Ben-Shakhar (2009) tested innocent, guilty control, and guilty faking 
participants in two subsequent CITs. Participants were informed that their reactions would be 
monitored throughout, and that the first CIT involved the use of the polygraph whereas the 
second involved a human rater. While detached from the polygraph in the second session, 
respiration was actually still recorded through covert sensors in the seat and the back of the chair. 
Because guilty fakers seemed to continue their faking strategies even when detached from the 
polygraph, the use of covert measures did not provide the expected success. Despite the legal and 
ethical issues that this approach may raise, it seems worthwhile to continue the quest for covert 
measures (e.g., eyetracking, laser doppler vibrometry, functional near-infrared spectroscopy 
(fNIRS), thermal imaging), and ways to obscure what is being measured. Recently, Maoz et al 
(2012) explored the validity of the CIT with subliminal stimulus presentation. As participants do 
not know the identity of the stimulus, successful faking (i.e., increasing responding to the control 
items) may be more difficult. However, it was found that the subliminal presentation of the 
stimuli reduced the validity of the CIT. 
 Given it is very difficult to completely prevent faking, the examiner may engage into 
faking detection. One common way to detect faking, is the detection of movement (e.g., by 
sensors in the polygraph chair). Recently, it was argued that behavioral responding could be used 
to detect faking in the ERP-based CIT (Rosenfeld et al., 2008). This is an interesting approach, 
that could be corroborated with other attempts to use behavioral responding to detect faking 
(Agosta, Ghirardi, Zogmaister, Castiello, & Sartori, 2011; Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & 
Snowden, 2010).  
Although successful faking has been shown to lower the sensitivity of the CIT, it does not 
affect specificity. It should therefore be acknowledged that many accepted forms of evidence 
such as fingerprints, DNA or confessions are also vulnerable to simple methods analogous of 
faking. Wearing gloves will prevent leaving fingerprints. This has never resulted in an argument 
that these methods should not be acceptable in court. It simple means they should be used as 
challenge tests. Presence of fingerprints, DNA, or a confession is indicative of guilt, but absence 
in not indicative of innocence. In line with this reasoning, the CIT outcome should be handled in 
a similar manner: an information present outcome is indicative of guilt, while an information 
absent outcome is less indicative of innocence.   
Key challenge#3. Leakage. 
Although the false positive rate of the CIT is low, this does not imply that a ´hit´ on the CIT 
necessarily implies guilt. The main reason is that the CIT assesses recognition, not guilt. Indeed 
it has been demonstrated that mere recognition in the absence of guilt is sufficient for differential 
responding in the CIT (Bradley, Barefoot, & Arsenault, 2011). Thus, when the CIT indicates 
recognition it is important to consider possible sources of that recognition. In case of the crime 
CIT, being guilty of the crime is one plausible explanation for recognition, yet there are other 
possible explanations. Innocent bystanders are also likely to recognize the crime details, as are 
innocents who are exposed to the critical information through other means, through previous 
interrogations (investigators may have confronted the suspect with some of the crime details), 
through media (in high profile cases), through accomplices, or the ´word on the street´. It is 
strongly recommended to inform all involved in the investigation of the CIT procedure and to 
prevent exposure of certain crime details. This procedure can reduce leakage of the critical 
details.  
Bradley and Warfield (1984) reasoned that innocent suspects who possess crime 
knowledge lie when instructed to deny crime recognition, but not when denying crime 
involvement. These authors therefore proposed the adjust the phrasing of the CIT and interrogate 
the suspect on crime involvement (e.g., Did you shoot…poison…beat…stabbed… the victim? ) 
rather than crime recognition (e.g., Do you know whether the victim was 
shot?...posioned?...beaten?...stabbed?). This modification of the CIT was labeled the ´Guilty 
Action Test´ or GAT as it asks about active involvement in the crime. In a direct comparison of 
the CIT and the GAT, Bradley et al (1996) found that knowledgeable innocents reacted less 
strong in the GAT than in the CIT, whereas guilty suspects peaked in both tests. Unfortunately, 
Gamer and colleagues (2010) failed to replicate these effects, and found that the vast majority of 
knowledgeable innocents showed differential responding in both the CIT as well as the GAT. In 
the absence of a final solution, it has been recommend to preview the test items with the 
examinee, asking to provide alternative explanations for possible crime recognition prior to 
conducting the CIT (Verschuere & Crombez, 2008).  
Perhaps additional tests could be used to determine the source of recognition in a CIT. 
For instance, the autobiographical IAT (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008) evaluates which of two 
contrasting autobiographical events is true. Contrasting ´I witnessed the [crime]´ with ´I enacted 
the [crime]´ should in principle help to determine whether crime recognition implies crime 
involvement.   
Summary 
Hundreds of studies have confirmed the validity of the CIT, whether measuring autonomic, 
behavioral, or brain responses. Effect sizes are very large on the group level, and several 
procedures have been proposed that allow to protect the innocent, while detecting a substantial 
amount of guilty suspects. We reviewed existing and novel applications of the CIT. False 
negatives, faking, and leakage are important challenges for the CIT, and we have suggested 
several ways to cope with these challenges.  
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Expected physiological responding in the Concealed Information Test (CIT). 
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Box1. Scoring the CIT 
ANS measures. The oldest and most simple method to make an individual judgment based upon 
these measures is the Lykken scoring (Lykken, 1959). Lykken proposed to score each question 
with either a 0, a 1 or a 2. The critical item is assigned a score of 2 if it elicits the greatest 
response, a score of 1 if it elicits the second biggest reaction, and otherwise a 0. Using n 
questions, the total score will vary between 0 and 2 times n, with n being the typical cut-off. 
Thus, scores of n or above are taken as an indication that there is systematic stronger responding 
to the correct alternatives than to the control alternatives, hence point to recognition. 
ERPs. The Lykken scoring cannot be used to compare P300 amplitude for correct versus 
incorrect alternatives. The size of the P300 can only be reliably determined by averaging across a 
great number of repetitions, leading to a single average for the critical items and a single average 
for the control items. To be able to do a classical statistical test, one needs a series of critical-
P300´s and control-P300´s rather than a single score for each of them. The elegant solution to 
this problem is the bootstrapping technique (Farwell & Donchin, 1991), which involves 
repeatedly - with replacement - drawing a sample from the critical and control items. For 
instance, if the ERP CIT consists of 50 critical items, one can draw a 1000 samples, each 
consisting of 20 critical items, providing a 1000 critical-P300 estimates. The same is done for the 
control items, allowing to conduct a classic statistical test on any size difference in critical- 
versus control-P300.  
fMRI. The earliest method to score an fMRI-CIT is to specify the brain regions of interest, and to 
determine whether there is greater activity in those regions in response to the correct items as 
compared to the incorrect items, using a simple voxel count (Kozel et al., 2005). More 
sophisticated scoring algorithms are now also available (Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & 
Schendan, 2011).  
RTs. To determine whether any RT-difference between correct and incorrect items is substantial 
enough to conclude that there is recognition, Noordraven and Verschuere (2013) proposed to use 
individual effect size. Specifically, it was proposed to use the standardized mean difference 
(Cohen’s d) with .20 as a cutoff to consider a difference as reliable (0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 are often 
used as benchmarks to label an effect as small, moderate, or large, respectively; Cohen, 1988). 
One advantage of this classifier is that it could be applied for all other measures as well.  
 
Box 2. Signal detection 
Intuitively, a test’s accuracy is often described in percentage correct decisions. This includes the 
proportion of true positives (proportion of guilty participants classified as guilty), the proportion 
of true negatives (proportion of innocent participants classified as innocent), the proportion of 
false positives (proportion of innocent participants incorrectly classified as guilty) and false 
negatives (proportion of guilty participants incorrectly classified as innocents). An important 
shortcoming of reporting accuracy in terms of percentages correct decisions is that it relies on an 
arbitrary cut-off point. According to situational demands, such a cut-off point can be chosen to 
either minimize false positives (e.g., in penal law) or false negatives (e.g., when trying to prevent 
a terrorist attack). Several measures exist that allow for reporting accuracy regardless of the cut-
off point. Most widely used is the d statistic. This statistic represents the degree of separation 
between the distribution of the detection measure (e.g., the relative difference in SCR between 
the critical and the neutral alternative) in guilty and innocent participants, expressed in standard 
deviation (National Research Council, 2003).  
 
Manuscript EP 2013-0020 Reply to reviewers 
Editor  
1. First of all, I think it is important to have a clear idea of the target audience for the special issue we 
are preparing. I think most readers of this issue will not be experts in the field of legal psychology, let 
alone of lie detection in any form. The target audience will expect to be informed about the state of the art 
in the topic without taking for granted any detailed knowledge on techniques and research paradigms or 
terminology. I therefore agree with Reviewer 1 that it would be good to explicitly introduce the two 
different paradigms CQT and CIT in the beginning of the manuscript.  
In the opening paragraph, we now illustrate the problems of the arousal-based approach by focusing in 
detail on the CQT. In doing so, we introduce the polygraph, the CQT, the CQT test assumptions, and the 
most important critiques.  
2. I agree also with Reviewer 2 that the paper is too long. However, several parts contain too much detail 
for the purposes of an overview article, especially on scoring and subtle differences in assessment 
methods. I think it is not the purpose to explain to readers how to do an optimal assessment on their own, 
but rather how valid the approach is, what the problems are, and how existing problems could be 
addressed in the future. Therefore it should not be a problem to shorten the manuscript by about a 
quarter to approximately 7500 words. Please consider the suggestions of Reviewer 2 how to rearrange 
and shorten the manuscript.  
Following the suggestions of the editor and Reviewer2, we substantially shortened the manuscript (to 
about 6000 words). In particular, we drastically shortened the ´Validity´ Chapter and the ´Key 
Challenges´ chapters. Furthermore, we moved information on scoring details to a Box such that that 
information is available for the interested reader, but it does not hinder the flow of the manuscript.  
3. I do not understand the claim that stimulus novelty plays a role in the CIT (in the "Theory" section). 
Although critical and control items normally have a ratio of 1:4, all items are novel for truth tellers, and 
even for liars all items as such are novel, except perhaps the critical item that is the only one the culprit 
may have knowledge about. But this should decrease the standard CI effect. So please explain in more 
detail how novelty of items can account for CIT effects. 
This is a good point, and something we would like to clarify. In the context of orienting theory, novelty 
refers to a change in the environment. In research on novelty orienting, this could be a deviant tone (e.g., 
65dBA) among a series of standard tones (e.g., 55dBA), or a colored figure among a series of black-and-
white figures. These stimuli are not completely novel in the sense that the examinee has never been 
confronted with them in their life. Rather, the deviant stimulus is relatively novel, in the sense that it 
deviates from the others and a such represents a ´change in the environment´. Within the context of the 
CIT, the critical item differs from the other items and presents a change in environment, only for the 
guilty examinee. Item homogeneity assures that there is no change in the environment for the innocent. 
As such, novelty orienting contributes to the CIT effect. Furthermore, the more the stimulus deviates from 
the other stimuli, the greater the orienting reflex towards it. The greater the number of standard tones, the 
greater the orienting reflex to the deviant tone. Likewise, the greater the number of control items, the 
greater the orienting reflex to the critical item. 
4. You mention "orienting theory" but you do not explain what it is, nor do you mention a reference. You 
claim that the CIT has a solid theoretical basis, but I did not find anything on it in the manuscript (see 
also Reviewer 2). 
We did explain orienting theory in the original manuscript, but given comments 4 and 5 of the editor and 
comment 4 of reviewer2, it becomes clear that we needed to clarify the orienting theory. We rewrote the 
Theory Chapter, aiming to clarify Orienting theory, providing referenes for it, and pointing to the key 
findings that empirically support it.   
5. I did not understand how the biographical test works. Please explain in a bit more detail.  
We tried to clarify how the autobiographical test works, by giving an example of a typical question in 
such as test. To be consistent, we now provide an example for all four paradigms. 
6. I did not understand how it could help to present the examinee with all items before the CIT proper 
(Nakayama, 2002). In truth tellers you can detect inhomogeneous items, but in culprits this 
inhomogeneity is confounded with concealed knowledge of the critical items, and in my understanding the 
presentation of all items should ruin the test, shouldn't it? 
Presentation of the items before running the test has several advantages. Most importantly, it allows to 
verify that the test in unbiased, preventing the subject to come up with a post hoc explanation for 
enhanced responding. Say the examinee in a robbery case reacts stronger to the correct item (Ipod) than to 
the other items (laptop, smartphone, 200euro, credit card), and is confronted with the test result. At that 
time, the examinee might state: ´Well, that must be because I just lost my IPod, and I felt distressed when 
you asked me about it´. Presenting the items before the test allows to avoid such post hoc reasoning. The 
examinee could for instance determine to drop any item or question that may be biased. Of course, there 
is the possibility that the examinee systematically points to the correct items as biased items, but this in 
itself can be an indication of crime recognition (Meijer, Smulders, Johnston, & Merckelbach, 2007). 
There are also legal and ethical reasons to advocate presenting the items before the test: The examinee has 
the right to be informed on how the test will look like before providing informed consent (Verschuere & 
Crombez, 2008). Despite the practical, legal, and ethical advantages, it is of course possible that 
‘exposure to the relevant questions prior to the examination would tend to decrease the differential 
orienting response to the relevant and comparison questions and weaken the test’s ability to discriminate 
(National Research Council, 2003; p. 77)’. It is unclear, however, why this would be the case as prior 
exposure will not affect the critical item´s significance or relative novelty within the test. In two studies, 
we nonetheless tested this possibility, and did not find any detrimental effect of prior exposure to CIT 
validity (Verschuere & Crombez, 2008). An elaborate discussion of the advantages of prior exposure 
seems to fall out of the scope of the review given the request to shorten our manuscript substantially. Yet, 
we rewrote the sentence to clarify the advantages of prior exposure. 
7. "civilized countries" is not a good label, unless you want to allude to the glorious imperialistic past. 
We deleted this sentence. 
8. The Chapter "Validity: From the group..." contains a lot on scoring details that could be shortened. 
See reply to comment 2 of the editor. 
9. On one hand it is claimed that the CIT can be used to detect simulated amnesia, on the other hand that 
subliminal presentation of critical stimuli still have an effect in CIT. If subliminal stimuli can have an 
effect, implicit knowledge (that is not introspectively accessible due to amnesia) could also. 
Implicit memory is indeed a possibility that has been raised in the literature (Huntjens et al., 2012), and 
there are case studies (in prosopagnostic patients) that indicate that the CIT may be reactive to implicit 
memory. Further empirical research is needed to establish whether the CIT may function as a tests of 
implicit memory (Allen, 2011), and this discussion seems to fall out of the scope of the present 
manuscript.  
10. Please omit bullet points in the key challenge #1 section, a simple list will do. 
OK 
11. Also the key challenge sections can be drastically shortened. 
 See reply to comment 2 of the editor. 
Reviewer 1  
1.Because most readers will not be very familiar with this topic it would be helpful to add a bit more 
background information to the first paragraph. Many people will probably not be aware of the fact that 
different tests are subsumed under the heading of “lie detector” or “polygraph.”  If the author(s) would 
shortly outline the rationale behind the Control Question Test, it might be easier to grasp that the two 
tests are completely different.  
See reply to comment 1 of the editor. 
2. I wonder whether one should really suggest the application of CIT in immigration cases. Immigration 
officers’ assumptions are often based on information about the situation or specific incidents in the 
emigration country that are very often difficult to verify. These are not good preconditions for a CIT.  
Immigrants sometimes present false information in order to try to enhance their chance of acquiring the 
right to reside. For instance, they may falsely tell that they come from a country where they would fear 
prosecution for their political conviction, sexuality or ethnicity. Immigrant officers try to check the 
plausibility of the story, among others by checking factual knowledge on the claimed county of origin. 
We think that the CIT may also be of use for that purpose. We have tried to clarify our reasoning in the 
revised manuscript.  
3. I found the discussion on “false negatives” and “faking” very interesting but very detailed and here 
and there a bit redundant. Maybe this discussion could be shortened a bit.   
See reply to comment 2 of the editor. 
Reviewer 2  
1. But the review is sometimes tedious and the central theme seems to be lost, especially after the 
half of the paper. The review is too long and some chapters will get better by shortening (e. g. 
chapter “validity: From the group to the individual”: in the reviewers opinion the authors lost the 
central theme and it is difficult for the reader to get the main message of this chapter). All in all, the 
review should be shortened to 7500 words at all.  
 
See reply to comment2 of the editor.  
  
2. Please provide more information regarding the neurobiology of the CIT. Which brain regions are 
activated in more detail? What is about guilty knowledge tests in the scanner?  
We now elaborate on the brain regions that were found to be differentially reactive in the CIT, and point 
to their possible functional relevance.   
3. Chapter “measures”: Perhaps it would improve this chapter if the statistical basis for the decision 
(cut-off etc.) from chapter “validity: from group to the individual” are mentioned here.  
We shortened the scoring section and moved it to a Box. The remainder of the ´Validity: from group to 
the individual´ regarding individual hit rates was moved to the Validity section. 
4. Chapter “theory”: Please describe the alternative theories in more detail. What empirical data exists 
for the several different theories? 
See reply to comment 5 of the editor. 
5.  Please provide the literature for the meta-analysis at the beginning of the chapter “validity”.  
We rearranged the Validity chapter. We start the chapter with a description of the paradigms used to 
determine the validity. Next, we summarize the results of laboratory validity research. We end by 
discussing the need for more field research. 
6.    Chapter “key challenge 1”, “key challenge 2” and “key challenge 3”: Please shorten the chapter 
and work out you central theme. Provide your (new) ideas and suggestions for the researcher and 
practitioner in a clearer and more distinct way. 
See reply to comment2 of the editor.  
 
 
